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Susan D. Franck,* Calvin P. Garbin** and Jenna M. Perkins***✝	
  
“We’ve learned from experience that the truth will come out. Other
experimenters will repeat your experiment and find out whether you were
wrong or right. Nature’s phenomena will agree or they'll disagree with your
theory. And, although you may gain some temporary fame and excitement, you
will not gain a good reputation as a scientist if you haven't tried to be very
careful in this kind of work.”1 – Richard P. Feynman, Nobel Prize Winner in
Physics (1965)

Social science promotes the acquisition of knowledge based upon data
that we derive from observable and knowable phenomena. When social
science methods are being employed in a new context—such as the
assessment of international investment law—there is value in exploring the
underlying assumptions and normative baselines of the overall enterprise. We
therefore welcome the dialogue generated by Professor Van Harten in his
Yearbook contribution, The Use of Quantitative Methods to Examine Possible
Bias in Investment Arbitration (“Yearbook Contribution”), as it echoes the
areas for future consideration identified in 2008.2 We wish to offer a
framework for productive academic discourse and social science insights in
order to promote thoughtful future research and commentary in international
investment law. Clarifying the social science framework is necessary for
constructive and thoughtful assessment of empirical research on international
investment law. While we recognize this approach makes Through the
Looking Glass somewhat unusual, our hope is that we can promote the
evolution of knowledge by situating the discussion within a larger literature.
The Yearbook Contribution raises various issues about a 2009 Harvard
International Law Journal article.3 We begin by identifying our core concerns
with the Yearbook Contribution, namely that it does not identify that: (1) the
Harvard International article stated the limitation of the OECD-measure and,
all analyses—even analyses using the measure that Van Harten suggests—
found no relationship between development variables and outcome;4 (2) small*
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1
RICHARD P. FEYNMAN & RALPH LEIGHTON, “SURELY YOU’RE JOKING, MR. FEYNMAN!”:
ADVENTURES OF A CURIOUS CHARACTER 312 (1986).
2
Susan D. Franck, Empiricism and International Law: Insights for Investment Treaty
Dispute Resolution, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 767, 774, 784, 787-90, 793, 794 (2008).
3
Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50
HARV. INT’L L.J. 435 (2009) [hereinafter Franck, Harvard International article].
4
See infra Section II and page 7.
**
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n studies of international economic law phenomenon, including investment
treaty arbitration, are valuable;5 (3) the Harvard International article
acknowledged—in more than thirty separate instances—the limitations of the
data and the need for replication;6 (4) while we agree that perceived bias may
be a constructive area for future research, the Harvard International article
sought to first identify observable bias;7 and (5) the results were population
parameters for the pre-2007 dataset, and the Harvard International article’s
inferences beyond that population were neither unreasonable nor unfounded.8
In an effort to take methodological concerns seriously and develop a
common framework for future discussions, we address the issues raised above
in four parts. First, we describe the value of social science in international
investment law. Second, we explore the critique of one variable used in the
Harvard International article and find, upon replicating the analyses using
Van Harten’s proposed definition of development, there was still no reliable
relationship between development status and outcome. Yet, recognizing that
there can be different ways to measure development, we suggest refinement of
the existing variables for future analyses. Third, we identify social science
norms related to population and sample size, particularly for parameters on the
analyzed population and other inferences for ruling out the presence of
statistically large and medium sized effects. While the dataset of investment
arbitration awards provided relatively low statistical power and much
additional data would be required to detect the smallest possible effects, it is
likely to take several decades (perhaps in the order of 50 years) before the
necessary data exists to make such analysis possible. As a normative matter,
the authors believe that is too long to wait before conducting analyses on an
area with critical implications for private and public international law. The
better course is to conduct analyses that are methodologically sound ex ante,
report the analyses and acknowledge their limitations so that future researchers
can consider and expand upon the baseline. Finally, we explore opportunities
for the evolution of social science research of international investment law.
We conclude that the value of both careful research and informed critiques is
prudent in an area of international economic activity.
I.

FUNDAMENTALS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

The objective of using social science methodologies to study
international law phenomenon is to promote the systematic gathering and
analysis of data to test assumptions about reality in an effort to make the
best—and most informed—normative choices. Human beings gather, analyze
5

See infra Section III(A); see also id. at 4-5.
See infra Appendix I.
7
See infra pages 22, 24.
8
See infra Section III(B), III(C).
6
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and act on information in ways that can be a by-product of cognitive biases9
and lead to inadvertent errors.10 Recognizing this risk of error and in the hope
of improving decisions, social science offers empirical tools to correct our
potential misperceptions and to promote thoughtful and informed decisions.
Although empirical analysis need not focus on a single methodology, as the
Yearbook Contribution focuses upon quantitative research, we consider the
value of quantitative analysis of investment treaty disputes. In an effort to do
this in a methodologically rigorous manner and to create a common
framework of social science norms, this Section has three goals. First, it
places social science research into a broader context about the search for
knowledge to aid normative choices. Second, it argues that quantitative
methodologies are valuable. Third, it explores key social science concepts.
A.

The Contextual Value of Empirical Knowledge

Scholarship is about the search for knowledge in an effort to
understand, to act upon and to interact with our world. There are, however,
different ways to gain knowledge. Knowledge can be derived from: (1)
instinct or intuition, (2) reliance on an authority, (3) the use of logic or
rationalism, or (4) use of empirical science.11
Instinct or intuition is an impressionistic way of amassing knowledge.
It can have a powerful effect on our beliefs,12 but yet these beliefs can be
wrong given our susceptibility to cognitive biases.13 Authority involves
gaining knowledge by relying on information from a respected source, and
believing that information to be true.14 Even if authorities express their beliefs
forcefully, there are challenges to knowledge evolution if the beliefs of
authorities are wrong. Logic is third way of amassing knowledge. Although it
9

Cognitive biases that can affect our data collection, analysis, and decision-making
include: (1) confirmation bias; (2) expectation bias; (3) selective perception; (4) the projection
bias; and (5) blind spot bias. See, e.g., DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL (2008);
JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 171–77, 191–92, 205-07, 221–27 (4th ed. 2008);
SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING (1993); Ronald Chen
& Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge Structures on Law and
Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103 (2004).
10
See generally ARIELY, supra note 9; Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in
Risk Regulation, 156 U. PENN. L. REV. 741 (2008).
11
DONALD H. MCBURNEY & THERESA L. WHITE, RESEARCH METHODS 2-3 (8th ed. 2010);
see also SHERRI L. JACKSON, RESEARCH METHODS AND STATISTICS: A CRITICAL THINKING
APPROACH 6-7 (3d ed. 2009); ANTHONY M. GRAZIANO & MICHAEL L. RAULIN, RESEARCH
METHODS: A PROCESS OF ENQUIRY 7-11 (7th ed. 2010).
12
McBurney & White, supra note 11, at 3-4.
13
See KEITH E. STANOVICH, HOW TO THINK STRAIGHT ABOUT PSYCHOLOGY 13 (9th ed.
2010).
14
McBurney & White, supra note 11, at 2-3; Jackson, supra note 11, at 7.
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helps us draw inferences and understand when conclusions are improper, logic
is limited when the factual predicate—namely the intellectual premise—for
the reasoning is incorrect.15 Logic and rational analysis, therefore, can benefit
from insights from a process that permits the falsification of underlying factual
predicates; this, in turn, promotes a more informed (but not perfect) basis for
related analyses, conclusions and normative choices.
The scientific method attempts to gain knowledge from reality-based
observation that defines a problem, forms a hypothesis, collects data, draws
inferences and communicates the findings.16 Where there are clear, sound and
systematic ex ante research protocols, the knowledge derived from that
process is normatively preferable to chance alone and more verifiable than
intuition or authority. What makes science unique is a “willingness to change
[initial] beliefs based on objectively obtained empirical evidence derived from
their method of enquiry.”17 The real value of empiricism is the fundamental
freedom to admit errors. The intensity of a belief in truth (or falsity) of a
hypothesis about is irrelevant.18 Rather, the scientific enquiry is about
“‘making mistakes in public—making mistakes for all to see, in the hopes of
getting others to help with the corrections’ . . . and continually adjusting
theory when data do not accord with it.”19 Fundamentally, a social scientific
approach to the analysis of legal phenomena means that we can attempt to
disprove falsehoods and can adjust to reality as reality adjusts around us.
B.

A Normative Preference for Empirical Perspectives of Investment
Treaty Disputes

International investment law faces a fundamental question: How do we
choose to amass knowledge about an area of fundamental economic activity in
a time of global economic transition? We believe that reliance on scientific
methodologies with sound ex ante research protocols (whether the research is
quantitative, qualitative, or mixed-methods), is worth the resulting costs20 and
preferable to instinct, intuition or chance alone.21
Reliance on quantitative analyses utilizing aggregate data may be
challenging for lawyers, particularly as many lawyers are trained to focus on
individual cases and to identify definitive truth. The essence of quantitative
15

McBurney & White, supra note 11, at 3; Jackson, supra note 11, at 8-9.
McBurney & White, supra note 11, at 5-9; Stanovich, supra note 13, at 9-10; ROBERT
M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & THOMAS S. ULEN, EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 721 (2010).
17
McBurney & White, supra note 11, at 10.
18
PETER B. MEDAWAR, ADVICE TO A YOUNG SCIENTIST 39 (1979).
19
Stanovich, supra note 13, at 28 quoting DANIEL C. DENNETT, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS
IDEA: EVOLUTION AND THE MEANING OF LIFE 380 (1995).
20
See, e.g., Franck, Empiricism and International Law, supra note 2, at 774.
21
ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, ECONOMETRIC MODELS & ECONOMIC
FORECASTS xvi-xv (4th ed. 1998).
16
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social science norms is that, in an effort to get better information, one must
avoid the temptation to focus on isolated and unrepresentative examples and
recognize there will not be quick, easy, definitive answers. Rather, “an
empirical approach is one of ongoing inquiry. Each new study makes an
incremental factual advance, building on the empirical work that has come
before it and raising new questions for future inquiry”.22 No single piece of
research is perfect or irrefutable for all time.
Social science rejects “truthiness”23 in favor of data—and
acknowledges that data and ideas can (and arguably must) evolve over time.
Some of the most fundamental breakthroughs in society have come from using
knowledge that is derived from systematic, empirical observation to re-assess
conventional wisdom.24 Recognizing the inevitable challenges but
understanding the corresponding benefits, it is necessary to conduct empirical
analyses to assess the existing baselines and use what we know to consider
and evaluate where we wish to be normatively in the future. Particularly in
the context of investment treaty arbitration with a small but growing
population of disputes, it is constructive to take snapshots over time, to
consider what we know and to consider the implications for the future as we
add to our knowledge over time.
C.

Defining Fundamental Terms

The Yearbook Contribution uses the terms “valid,” “reliable” and
“transparent.” In light of social science norms, we prefer to begin with a clear
statement25 of how we understand these core terms. As studying investment
treaty dispute resolution is relevant26 to policy debates, the Harvard
International article was an effort to take seriously the concerns of NGO and
government officials. The objective was to use data, measures and models to
22

Lawless, et al., supra note 16, at 15.
Stanovich, supra note 13, at 29 quoting FARHAD MANJOO, TRUE ENOUGH: LEARNING
TO LIVE IN A POST-FACT SOCIETY 198 (2008) (emphasis in original) (““Stephen Colbert
coined the term ‘truthiness.’ Truthiness is the ‘quality of a thing feeling true without any
evidence suggesting it actually was’”).
24
For example, cognitive psychologists who identified flaws in eyewitness testimony and
created research that, in combination with DNA testing, has permitted wrongly convicted
individuals to go free. See, e.g., Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Identification
Procedures and the Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years
Later, 33 LAW. & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (2009); Gary L. Wells, Theory, Logic, and Data: Paths to a
More Coherent Eyewitness Science, 22 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCH. 853 (2008).
25
See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 74 (2002)
(“This process of “clarification” is sometimes called “operationalizing,” “operationally
defining,” or more simply, “defining” the concepts.”); see also Graziano & Raulin, supra note
11, at 74-75, 152; Jackson, supra note 11, at 57-58.
26
Lawless, et al., supra note 16, at 27-28.
23
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aid in the evaluation of their hypothesis—namely that there was bias against
the developing world—because, if true, it would be a cause for concern.
1.

Validity

As a general matter, a measure is considered valid if it measures what
it purports to measure.27 Yet there are different types of validity, including but
not limited to internal validity, external validity and construct validity.
Internal validity is concerned with the procedural control a researcher
has and maintains over his/her study, typically whether internal research
procedures have inadvertently introduced a confounding variable or other
error.28 In assessing internal validity, it is important to examine whether
factors other than the variable of interest could be responsible for the results.29
External validity refers to the generalizability of results to “other
participants, settings, and times.”30 A study is generalizable when it has
relevance to real life.31 The use of archival data—like data in investment
arbitration awards—is valuable because it derives from the real world
activities. Although the Yearbook Contribution incorrectly labels the concerns
as issues of “internal validity”,32 the real concern seems to be with questions
about the generalizability of the results. External validity concerns about
generalizability of pre-2007 data to the current population are reasonable. For
the then-known population of public awards analyzed, the results were
population parameters. Concern for inferences about the larger population
(namely private awards, post June 1, 2006 awards or future awards) is why the
Harvard International article called for caution and replication.33
Construct validity is the “degree to which a study measures and
manipulates the underlying psychological elements that the researcher claims
to be measuring and manipulating.”34 In assessing construct validity, it is
27

Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Richard Gonzales, Questions and Comparisons: Methods of
Research in Social Psychology 35, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 35
(Michael A. Hogg & Joel Cooper eds., 2007).
28
Graziano & Raulin, supra note 11, at 164; Jackson, supra note 11, at 207-12; Lawless,
et al., supra note 16, at 36-37.
29
Kathryn C. Oleson & Robert M. Arkin, Reviewing and Evaluating a Research Article
66, in The PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH HANDBOOK: A GUIDE FOR GRADUATE STUDENTS AND
RESEARCH ASSISTANTS 66 (Frederick T. L. Leong & James T. Austin eds., 2d ed., 2006).
30
SAVILLE, supra note 2, at 90; Lawless, et al., supra note 16, at 39-40.
31
SAVILLE, supra note 2, at 90. This is also sometimes referred to as ecological validity.
Lawless, et al., supra note 16, at 39.
32
The Yearbook Contribution states, “This limitation arose from a lack of data. It affects
the internal validity of the study by removing the prospect of results that could support
inferences about the expected connections between development status and outcome.” Van
Harten, YB Contribution, at 16. Internal validity relates to the integrity of the internal research
protocols—not a lack of data.
33
See Appendix I.
34
SAVILLE, supra note 2, at 85; see also Epstein & King, supra note 25, at 87-88;
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important to determine whether the researcher operationalized his/her
variables properly.35 Has the researcher clearly explained how the variable was
defined? Were alternatives considered and tested? Sometimes, it is difficult to
operationalize a variable of interest—such as what it means to be part of the
developed or developing world—and a proxy variable is substituted.36 Put
another way, “different researchers may choose to define similar constructs in
different ways.”37 Scholars may disagree about the relative merits of certain
constructs, but if there are multiple variables attempting to assess a construct
and those definitions are stated expressly, that is a step in the right direction.
Concern for construct validity is appropriate.
The Yearbook
Contribution raises two issues about the Harvard International article, namely
the use of OECD membership as a proxy for “development status” and
adjusting amounts awarded for inflation. We explore the OECD variable in
Section II. In all models analyzed, including those using Van Harten’s
construct, the definition did not affect the results—the data did not reveal a
significant relationship between development status of respondents,
development status of presiding arbitrators and outcomes.38 As regards the
inflation adjustment, replicating the models in the Harvard International to
adjust for inflation, the results still did not reveal a significant relationship
between development-related variables and amounts awarded. The Harvard
International article coded the raw data from the actual date of an award.39
For present purposes, we used two separate indices, namely the Consumer
Price Index and Gross Domestic Product per capita, to adjust all awards to the
common year of 2006 (i.e. the close of the dataset). Appendix II describes the
sixteen different models we analyzed to consider whether adjusting for
inflation made a difference in the findings.40 All of those analyses replicated
Lawless, et al., supra note 16, at 40-41.
35
Kathryn C. Oleson & Robert M. Arkin, Reviewing and Evaluating a Research Article,
in The PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH HANDBOOK: A GUIDE FOR GRADUATE STUDENTS AND
RESEARCH ASSISTANTS 59, 67 (Frederick T. L. Leong & James T. Austin eds., 2d ed., 2006);
Stanovich, supra note 13, at 39.
36
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 18 (H. A. H. D’haenen, John A. den Boer & Paul Wilner,
eds.).
37
Lawless, et al., supra note 16, at 51.
38
See infra notes 65-70.
39
The Harvard International article stated that it relied upon the archival dataset from the
North Carolina article. Franck, Harvard International article, supra note 3, 454 at n.105.
Although the Yearbook Contribution mentions that article only once, Van Harten, YB
Contribution, page 11 at n.24, the North Carolina article explained, “The author later used a
single Web site to convert the foreign currencies into a U.S. dollar amount (using the date of
the award as the relevant conversion date) to create a common currency.” Susan D. Franck,
Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 22
n.98 (2007) [hereinafter Franck, Evaluating Claims].
40
Appendix II also addresses the concerns raised by the Yearbook Contribution in

8

[draft-not for citation]

the results in the Harvard International article, namely that there was no
relationship between development variables and amounts awarded. Even with
the limitation of low power, this demonstrates that the results in the Harvard
International article were robust.
2.

Reliability

Reliability relates to the consistency of a measurement instrument.41
“Reliability is the extent to which it is possible to replicate a measurement,
reproducing the same value (regardless of whether it is the right one) on the
same standard for the same subject at the same time.”42 Measures are reliable
if they produce the same value over time given the same inputs.43 For
example, if you use a scale to measure the weight of a rock, the measure—
namely, the scale—is reliable if the same rock weighs the same amount each
time it is placed on a scale.44 Producing consistent results over time is not only
reliability, however. It is also a function of replicability.
3.

Replicability and Transparency

Transparency—meaning the identification of research protocols and
choices—is a means to the end of replicability.45 The “confirmation of
research findings through replication by other researchers is an essential part
of scientific methodology.”46 Researchers try to use identical or similar
protocols to collect and analyze data; and the objective is usually to replicate
connection with winsorizing data. The skewness in the winzorized data was less than raw
data, trimmed data or even squared data, which warranted its use in the Harvard International
article. When replicating the research by analyzing both log and inverse transformed data
with skewness levels of less than 1.0, the results were the same. There was no reliable
relationship between the variables of interest and amounts awarded. Even with low power, the
congruity in results demonstrates the results in the Harvard International article were robust.
41
Stanovich, supra note 13, 38; Graziano & Raulin, supra note 11, at 78-79; see also
Jackson, supra note 11, at 65.
42
Epstein & King, supra note 25, at 83; see also Lawless, et al., supra note 16, at 42.
43
See Epstein & King, supra note 25, at 85 (“The key to producing reliable measures is to
write down a set of very precise rules for the coders . . . to follow—with as little as possible
left to interpretation and human judgment.”); see also Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra note
39, at 23 (describing the coding process).
44
The reliability of the OECD measure over time is a constructive point. Theoretically,
OECD membership—or World Bank development classification—may shift over time as
states join the OECD and/or their gross national income (GNI) increases. One would hope,
states would evolve over time and poverty might be eliminated or minimized. It would be
unfortunate if the Yearbook contribution’s search for “reliability” means that we do not take
into account the idea that the developing world may indeed develop.
45
See Epstein & King, supra note 25, at 38 (2002); Stanovich, supra note 13, at 10.
46
William G. Dewald, Jerry G. Thursby & Richard G. Anderson, Replication in
Empirical Economics: The Journal of Money, Credit and Banking Project, 76 AM. ECON.
REV. 587, 587 (1986); see also Lawless, et al., supra note 16, at 26.
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aspects of the original study while expanding the research to add something
new. A norm exists by which researchers can ask to use, and add to, data
collected by others, either directly from the authors or from a journal that has
published work, subject to concerns about proprietary nature of the data.47
The dataset for the Harvard International article has been publicly available
from the North Carolina Law Review since 2007. 48
Transparency typically involves providing enough information to
replicate the research in some manner or to understand the implications of a
study, including internal validity, external validity, construct validity and the
like.49 Providing information aids the assessment of the underling research as
well as the value of inferences drawn from the data, methods and analysis.
Nevertheless, the Yearbook Contribution objects to certain results being
“reported only in a series of footnotes or elliptically in the body of the
article.”50 We recognize that: (1) consumers of scholarship are capable of
reading all the words on a page, (2) standards of the American Psychological
Association—let alone conventions in U.S. law reviews—do not require
everything to be in the text and permit (and sometimes require) footnotes, and
(3) the Harvard International article placed key information in the text and
used footnotes to add complementary information or clarify details.
The Harvard International article is wholly transparent about the timebounded nature of its underlying archival data. The article explained its
measurement system, described the statistical choices and offered results.
Further, it explained the limitations and recommended replication to assess
whether the results would continue to hold over time. Given the nature of the
data and the statistical power of the research, as the population grows over
time, it is entirely possible that the results of the research may change and the
Harvard International article may only be an initial historical snapshot.
Future analyses may also find different or complementary nuances as we
develop more sophisticated measures and models in the quest to minimize
statistical error. Productive areas of future scholarship on investment law may
focus on such historical shifts and methodological innovations. In the interim,
we are all free to—based upon the data and results—draw independent
inferences and make our own normative choices. It is the purview of
47

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, PUBLICATION MANUAL 12-13 (6th ed. 2010)
[hereinafter APA Manual].
48
Franck submitted her data to the North Carolina Law Review and made it available
upon request. Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra note 39, at 17, 20 (2007). Van Harten
received the relevant subset of the data upon request and has acknowledged this. Van Harten,
YB Contribution 33, n.71. The proprietary dataset is also now available online in connection
with the publication of Rationalizing Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration.
49
See, e.g., MARK R. LEARY, INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH METHODS 36570 (3d ed., 2001).
50
Van Harten, YB Contribution at 18.
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academics to debate those inferences, and it is the occupation of policy makers
to make choices. Even if we recognize that research will never capture the
complexity of reality,51 it would be irresponsible to ignore empirical evidence
generated in accordance with scientific best practices simply because evidence
does not comport with conventional wisdom or even a research hypothesis.
II.

MEASURING DEVELOPMENT

One of the most challenging aspects of any social science inquiry is
construct validity, namely finding an indicator to capture a social phenomenon
in which a researcher is interested. “It may be the case that the variable being
explained cannot be measured accurately, either because of data collection
difficulties or because it is inherently unmeasureable and a proxy variable
must be used in its stead.”52 The meaning of “Development Status” is
instructive. There is not a consistent legal definition of this concept; and
development means different things to different people. For example, the
World Trade Organization does not define development; rather, it permits
member states to self-define their development status.53 The lack of a
consistent definition also creates confusion in international environmental
law.54 When there is no predefined and exclusive measure for legal
phenomenon, it is preferable to use definitions that come from “judgments
made for entirely different purposes by other researchers.”55 The Harvard
International article does this with the OECD variable. Hallward-Driemer’s
article56 uses OECD membership to analyze development. As the variable
51

See Franck, Empiricism and International Law, supra note 2, at 790.
PETER KENNEDY, GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 5 (5th ed. 2003); see also Joshua B.
Fischman & David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How Should We Measure It?, 29
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 133, 143-45 (2009).
53
See World Trade Organization, Who are the developing countries in the WTO?, at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/d1who_e.htm (“There are no WTO definitions
of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries. Members announce for themselves whether they
are ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries”); Anu Bradford & Eric A. Posner, Universal
Exceptionalism in International Law, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 32 n.159 (2011); Andrew D.
Mitchell & Joanne Wallis, Pacific Pause: The Rhetroic of Special & Differential Treatment,
the Reality of WTO Accession, 27 WISC. INT’L L.J. 663, 696-97 (2010).
54
Benjamin L. Liebman, Autonomy Through Separation?: Environment Law and the
Basic Law of Hong Kong, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 231, 261-62 (1998) (“Environmental
agreements are inconsistent in their definitions of development status . . . various treaties use
different standards to define developed and developing countries.”) (footnotes omitted).
55
GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE, SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL ENQUIRY:
SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 157 (1994) (emphasis in original).
56
See Mary Hallward-Driemeier, World Bank, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract
FDI?
Only
a
Bit…and
They
Could
Bite
(2003),
http://econ.worldbank.org/files/29143_wps3121.pdf at 8, 9, 11-12, 13 (referring to “rich
OECD countries”, distinguishing between OECD members and “developing countries”,
analyzing FDI flows “from OECD countries to developing country hosts”); see also Jeswald
W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral
52
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derives from a State’s decision to ratify the OECD Convention and other
social scientists studying investment employ the classification, it was
appropriate to use OECD membership to evaluate development.
The Harvard International article described the countries that were OECD
Convention signatories in 2006.57 It also included an alternative variable to
measure development status—namely the World Bank’s classification based
upon Gross National Income (GNI)—as a cross-check.58 The Harvard
International article explained: “Both OECD status and World Bank status
were assessed in order to address different conceptions of what development
can mean . . . For example, Mexico is a member of the OECD but is not
classified as a High Income country.”59 The Yearbook Contribution’s claim
that the limitations of the OECD variable “were not disclosed”60 is therefore
incorrect. Of course, the definition of development, whether based on OECD
membership or other indicators, is an area for dialogue. Yet, the Yearbook
Contribution suggests a new way of measuring “development” that is not
based upon any existing definition or research standards known to the authors.
Although we welcome contributions that better capture the construct of
development, such a variable should satisfy the criteria elaborated below.
First, the variable would have to specify its groupings of states.61 The
Yearbook Contribution refers to “East Bloc” countries without defining the
states. Second, the variable should be backed by a reasoned discussion
explaining what makes “Mexico, South Korea, Turkey, and [the] former East
Bloc,” different from other OECD members. Presumably this would be a
function of GNI or some other factor related to economic resources, yet it
would be helpful to conform to social science practice of explaining why there
Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J 67, 104-15 (2005); UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES IN
THE MID-1990S, 103 (1998); Eric Neumayer & Laura Spess, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties
Increase Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries?, 17 (May 2005), at
http://129.3.20.41/eps/if/papers/0411/0411004.pdf.
57
In 2006 and until 2010, the OECD members were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom,
and United States. OECD, List of OECD Member countries - Ratification of the Convention
on
the
OECD,
at
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html.
Franck used a State’s decision to join the OECD as to classify a state. Franck, Harvard
International article, supra note 3, at 455 n.110; see also Franck, Evaluating Claims, supra
note 39, at 28 n.125.
58
Franck, Harvard International article, supra note 3, at 455 n.112.
59
Id., 455 n.109.
60
Van Harten, YB Contribution at 33; see also id. at 15.
61
See supra note 25 (discussing the operationalization of variables).
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is “fidelity between the construct and the measure”.62 Third, the variable
should indicate the scale or categories proposed and why those are
normatively and statistically valid constructs.63 Finally, the variable should
clarify how it is meaningfully different—and of greater value—than the more
granular variable of World Bank Status. Understanding the nature of the
variable and the value it seeks create would be a welcome addition to the
larger dialogue on the meaning of “development.” In other words, new
variables should establish “facial validity, unbiasedness, and efficiency.”64
Presuming that Van Harten wished to create his own variable that excludes
OECD states from the OECD measure, for the purpose of this article, we
created a “development status” variable that started with OECD members but
excluded Mexico, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.65 We created
this measure both for the respondent states and the presiding arbitrators.66
However, even using that definition of “development status”, there were no
meaningful differences in outcomes, namely, at the macro level: (1) there was
no reliable pattern of relationship between development status variables and
winning or losing an arbitration, and (2) there was no reliable relationship
between development status variables and amounts awarded.
1. Replicating the results on page 460 of the Harvard International article
but using Van Harten’s definition of “development status,” there was still
no pattern of relationship between development status and whether a
respondent won or lost. When analyzing the set of cases with presiding
arbitrators from non-developed countries, there was no pattern of
relationship between developed or developing states (χ2(1) = 0.049; p =
0.83; r = 0.06; n = 14). In other words, in cases with presiding arbitrators
from developing countries, it was not possible to conclude that the
62

Lawless, et al., supra note 16, at 41.
The Yearbook Contribution refers to various categories including developed,
developing and transition economies. Although the authors asked for clarification of the
definition of measurement for respondent states, none has been forthcoming.
64
Epstein & King, supra note 25, at 89.
65
The Yearbook Contribution focuses on “Mexico, South Korea, Turkey, and the former
East Bloc countries”. Only three OECD members (Mexico, Czech Republic and Slovak
Republic) had awards in the dataset. There were no awards against South Korea or Turkey.
66
Classification of presiding arbitrators did not change as none were from Mexico, the
Czech Republic or the Slovak Republic. There were two changes in cases against the Czech
Republic: (1) Lauder, which involved a respondent win, and (2) CME, which involved a
claimant win. There was one change to the Slovak Republic, namely, CSOB, which involved
a respondent win on the treaty claim only. For Mexico, the state identified in the Harvard
International article, eight cases were reclassified, namely: (1) Azinian, which involved a
respondent win, (2) Feldman, which involved a claimant win, (3) GAMI, which involved a
respondent win, (4) Metalclad, which involved a claimant win, (5) Tecmed, which involved a
claimant win, (6) Thunderbird, which involved a respondent win, (7) Waste Management I,
which involved a respondent win, and (8) Waste Management II, which involved a respondent
win. For cases against Mexico, there were five government wins and three investor wins.
63
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outcomes for developed and developing countries were meaningfully
different. Similarly, when analyzing the set of cases with presiding
arbitrators from developed (i.e. OECD) countries, there was likewise no
relationship between states’ development status and success or defeat in
investment treaty arbitration (χ2(2) = 0.118; p = 0.73; r = 0.06; n = 33).67
Again, the data could not confirm that tribunals with presiding arbitrators
from the developed world decided cases against developed or developing
states in a meaningfully different way. Using Cohen’s conventions, the
effect sizes for the models were less than small and the large p-values
indicated the effects of the variables were far from statistically meaningful.
2. Replicating the results on page 465 of the Harvard International article
but using Van Harten’s definition of development, there was also no
statistically significant mean difference in amounts awarded based upon
development variables. First, using winzorized data, there was no
interaction among the development status of the respondent, the
development status of the presiding arbitrator and the amount awarded
(F(1,45) = 0.947; p = 0.37; r = 0.14; n = 49).68 Second, irrespective of
67

Jacob Cohen was a statistician and quantitative psychologist whose scholarship
explored power and effect size. Cohen’s conventions—small = 0.10, medium = 0.30, large =
0.50—indicate the effect sizes of both analyses were less than small (r = 0.06). JACOB COHEN,
STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 25, 113-16, 124 (2d ed.
1988). If there is no statistically significant result in a hypothesis test and the effect size is <
.10, generally it is unlikely the analysis suffers from a power problem (i.e. the sample is of an
insufficient size to detect a significant effect) or the possible effect may be so small that it will
be difficult to justify resources to research the issue. The authors recognize that, given the
small effect size, the power of the analysis is likely less than .20, which means there is
approximately an 80% chance of incorrectly retaining the null hypothesis. Similar to the
analysis in the Harvard International article, this means that to reliably ascertain the presence
of the effect, a sample of 1,562 awards would be needed. If the caseload grows at the
arguable rate of 30 per year, achieving this size would take approximately 50 years.
68
For the winzorized data, the mean awards were: (1) OECD Respondents with OECD
Presiding Arbitrators = US$850,418 (n = 5); (2) OECD Respondents with Non-OECD
Presiding Arbitrators = US$77,657 (n = 2); (3) Non-OECD Respondents with OECD
Presiding Arbitrators = US$1,077,183 (n = 30); (4) Non-OECD Respondents with Non-OECD
Presiding Arbitrators = US$2,177,070 (n = 12). For the raw data which includes statistical
outliers and exhibited positive skewing, the mean awards were (1) OECD Respondents with
OECD Presiding Arbitrators = US$850,418 (n = 5); (2) OECD Respondents with Non-OECD
Presiding Arbitrators = US$77,657 (n = 2); (3) Non-OECD Respondents with OECD
Presiding Arbitrators = US$10,334,852 (n = 30); (4) Non-OECD Respondents with NonOECD Presiding Arbitrators = US$18,569,314 (n = 12). Although the descriptive raw data
might raise a facial concern (namely what appear to be higher amounts awarded against nondeveloped states), the results indicated that the awards were statistically equivalent (namely all
of the amounts awarded are not statistically different from zero). The difference fades when
analyzing winzorized data. Although effect sizes suggest ruling out the possibility of either a
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whether the tribunal had a presiding arbitrator from a developed or
developing country, there was no statistically significant effect on the
amount awarded (F(1,45) = 0.029; p = 0.87; r = 0.03; n = 49). Third,
irrespective of whether the respondent was a developed or a developing
country, there was no statistically significant difference in the amount
awarded against developed or developing countries (F(1,45) = 1.462; p =
0.23; r = 0.17; n = 49).69 The same held true for raw amounts awarded.70

The replication demonstrates that even using Van Harten’s proposed
definition, the models could not identify a meaningful difference in
outcome—whether as a function of who won or amounts awarded. Although
two analyses exhibited low power that justifies replication before drawing
definitive conclusions beyond the dataset studied, the results indicate that the
findings of the Harvard International article were robust.
In 2010, there were changes to OECD membership. The complete list of
new additions is: Chile, Estonia, Israel and Slovenia.71 When conducting
future research, it would be constructive to account for the expanded
membership and to create a tighter nexus in the measurement of development
classification. For example, as the date of the award is the operative date for
many coding decisions, coding OECD and World Bank categories might use
the date of the award rather than the cut-off date of the dataset. In this way, it
would be possible to replicate and expand the analysis on the basis of
expanded data and also consider whether there is any statistically meaningful
difference between the different definitions of development status.

large or medium-sized effect of development on outcome, replication of research—with more
data and better modeling is necessary and was recognized in the Harvard International article.
69
For the interaction and the main effect of the development, the effect sizes were small
to coming close to medium (r = 0.14; r = 0.17). This means that the statistical power was
approximately .20 to .30, which indicates a 70-80% risk of committing a Type II error. In
order to isolate the smaller of these effects, a sample of 686 arbitration awards is required. In
contrast, for the main effect of the presiding arbitrator, the effect size was r = 0.03, which
suggests that the failure to detect the miniscule effect was likely not a function of power.
70
For the raw data using Van Harten’s definition of “development status”, there was no
statistically significant interaction among development of respondent, development of the
presiding arbitrator and outcome (F(1,45) = 0.050; p = 0.082; r = 0.03; n = 49. Likewise,
there was neither a significant main effect for the development status of the presiding
arbitrator (F(1,45) = 0.035; p = 0.85; r = 0.02; n = 49) nor a significant main effect for the
development status of the respondent state (F(1,45) = 0.485; p = 49; r = 0.10; n = 49). With
the miniscule effect sizes (r < .10), it is unlikely that the analyses suffer from a power
problem; out of an abundance of caution, given that the power of the analysis is approximately
.20 and there is a resulting 80% likelihood of a Type II error, replication is appropriate. The
sample size needed to ascertain the small effect (r = 0.10), would be 1,562 awards.
71
OECD, List of OECD Member countries – Ratification of the OECD Convention,
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html (last
visited Feb. 26, 2011).

Understanding Social Science Norms
III.

15

SMALL POPULATIONS AND SAMPLE SIZE

Analysis of small datasets is not per se problematic. It is appropriate when
handled with a proper understanding of data protocols. “Uncertainty and
limited data should not cause us to abandon scientific research” 72 While there
is inevitable uncertainty in social science, the possibility of statistical error
does not mean we should reject or ignore research. Rather, the better
approach is to consider the research along with its limitations. This Section
first explains small-n research is appropriate for investment treaty arbitration.
It then clarifies the results were parameters for the population studied and
explores limitations of possible inferences (expressly identified in the Harvard
International article). Even without being able to identify a reliable
relationship, the analyses also revealed it is possible to reject the notion that
development has a statistically large effect on outcome. Next, given the
transparent methods and acknowledged limits, this Section then explains that
the Harvard International article’s inferences were reasonable.
A.

Small-n Studies are Appropriate for Investment Treaty Arbitration

Scholars posit, “a basic premise of all empirical research—and indeed of
every serious theory of inference—is that all conclusions are uncertain to a
degree. After all, the facts we know are related to the facts we do not know but
would like to know only by assumptions that we can never fully verify. The
point is not to qualify every statement . . . but rather to estimate the degree of
uncertainty inherent in each conclusion and to report this estimate along with
every conclusion.”73 Prominent political scientists likewise explain that, while
limited information and uncertainty is inevitable, “this uncertainty should not
suggest that we avoid attempts at causal inference. Rather we should draw
causal inferences where they seem appropriate but also provide the reader with
the best and most honest estimate of the uncertainty of that inference. It is
appropriate to be bold in drawing causal inferences as long as we are
cautious in detailing the uncertainty of the inference.” 74
In international economic law, having only a small number of awards is
not surprising. In international trade disputes, under the GATT era settlement
processes, there were approximately nine cases a year; but under the new
Dispute Settlement Understanding at the World Trade Organization, there are

72

King, et al., supra note 55, at 8.
Epstein & King, supra note 25, at 50.
74
King, et al., supra note 55, at 76 (emphasis added); see also MILDRED L. PATTEN,
UNDERSTANDING RESEARCH METHODS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE ESSENTIALS 113 (7th ed.
2009).
73
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now approximately thirty to thirty-five per year.75 Professor Colares
empirically evaluates trade disputes and has, for example, analyzed a dataset
of forty-one NAFTA disputes.76 Other recent empirical legal studies outside
of international economic law have used samples in the order of forty to
sixty.77 The Harvard International research is thus not unusual or improper.
B.

Population Parameters and Limitations of Inferences

The research in the Harvard International article was done on a small
population of awards at a certain moment in time, and drawing inferences on
the population was technically unnecessary.78This means, based upon the
population at issue (namely publicly available awards before June 1, 2006),
for the models analyzed, the results were descriptively conclusive as to that
population. The results were also the first efforts to hypothesize
probabilistically about the population beyond initial dataset. This means,
when using statistics to infer beyond the dataset (namely private awards or
present and future arbitration outcomes), there is a risk of error. The Harvard
International article therefore called for replication to assess whether the
results are confirmed or rejected as ongoing population parameters. The article
reported p-values, means, standard deviations and cell counts; it calculated
effect sizes and conducted both post hoc and a priori power analyses (i.e. to
identify the size of future samples required to ascertain even the smallest
effect) to assess transparently the risk of error.79 The objective was to identify
what was known about the then-population and understand potential risks (and
implicit limitations) related to the growing population.
As the Harvard International article disclosed, the statistical power of the
inferences was low, and the related error rates were beyond levels traditionally
75

Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence and International Tribunals, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 46 (2005); Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure:
An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 15-16 (1999); see also
Eric Reinhardt, Adjudication without Enforcement in GATT Disputes, 45 J. CONFLICT RESOL.
174, 176-77 (2001) (referring to a database created for the forty-eight year period between
1948-1994 that contained a total of 298 disputes resulting in 143 rulings, for an average of
6.48 disputes per year and 3.12 rulings per year).
76
Juscelino F. Colares, An Empirical Examination of Product and Litigant-Specific
Theories for the Divergence Between NAFTA Chapter 19 and US Judicial Review, 42 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 691, 17 (2008).
77
See George S. Geis, An Empirical Examination of Business Outsourcing Transactions,
96 VIRGINIA L. REV. 241, 257-58 (2010) (using a sample of sixty contracts); Jed H.
Shugerman, The Twist of Long Terms: Judicial Elections, Role Fidelity and American Tort
Law, 98 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1359, 1421 (2010) (using an initial sample of 42 and then other
samples of 31, 14 and 11).
78
BRUCE J. CHALMER, UNDERSTANDING STATISTICS 2 (1986).
79
This comports with the norm that researchers “estimate the degree of uncertainty
inherent in each conclusion and to report this estimate along with every conclusion”. Epstein
& King, supra note 25, at 52.
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accepted levels.80 Yet, while the low power is not ideal, it was reality. The
reality was an inevitable by-product of what is, even now, arguably a small
population that is evolving from a historically recent paradigm shift in
international law. The Yearbook Contribution claims that, “Franck’s
statements of findings and conclusions were not qualified . . . by the lack of
data”.81 The Harvard International article, however, neither hid the relatively
low power of the analyses nor the risk of error; rather, the article stated these
limitations clearly—and at regular intervals.82 It acknowledged the existing
archival data and its limitations.83 The article included statements such as,
“Out of extra caution in this sensitive area, it would therefore be prudent to
engage in more research, with a larger sample, before establishing a
population parameter that development status is not reliably associated with
outcome.”84 For quantitative research in psychology, most journal articles
include a paragraph describing the limitations of a study within the discussion
section.85 The Harvard International article went beyond a simple paragraph.
It included a caveat at the end of each section of the research results as well as
an entire section dedicated to the limitations of the article. Appendix I
identifies over thirty statements in the Harvard International article alone that
pertained to disclosures about the potential limitations.
On multiple occasions in the primary text,86 the Harvard International
article referenced the effect size (i.e., how statistically large the effect of
development might be on outcome) and suggested that analyses were
underpowered and required replication. Every model analyzed in the Harvard
80

Cohen promulgated the standard of 80% power (20% risk of Type II error). Cohen,
supra note 67, at 56.
81
Van Harten, YB contribution at 17.
82
In conformity with the Rules of Inference standard, supra note 73, that each research
result should also reflect its limitation, every time the Harvard International article reported a
result, it also identified the effect size, the power, the risk of error and the size of a future
sample. Franck, Harvard International article, supra note 3, at 461, 461, 466-67, 469-70, 47476. The Yearbook Contribution agrees that it was “rigorous” to calculate the error rates “and
to indicate this limitation”. Van Harten, YB contribution at 18.
83
Franck, Harvard International article, supra note 3, at 458 n.105 (referring to Franck,
Evaluating Claims, supra note 39, which in turn describes in detail the creation and nature of
the archival data as well as related limitations, particularly pages 16-26).
84
Franck, Harvard International article, supra note 3, at 472.
85
JOHN J. SHAUGHNESSY, EUGENE B. ZECHMEISTER, & JEANNE S. ZECHMEISTER,
RESEARCH METHODS IN PSYCHOLOGY 465 (7th ed. 2006).
86
Although we are unaware of any guidelines for U.S. law reviews, the American
Psychological Association (APA) has standards for reporting quantitative results. APA
standards may not all be fully applicable to law—and it is questionable whether law reviews
will understand, want or encourage scholars to include such information in above the line text.
Yet the APA requires disclosure of information, such as statistical power, but does not require
it to be placed in a certain location. APA Manual, supra note 47, at 30. The Harvard
International article placed material in both the primary text and footnotes.
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International article—each of which failed to identify any statistically
significant reliable relationship between the variables of interest and outcome
in the pre-2007 population—methodically considered the risk of error, which
the Yearbook Contribution acknowledged.87
1. The Harvard International article did this for the OECD Chi-Square
analysis of winners and losers, even though the sizes of the potential
effects of development on outcome were either statistically less than
small (r = 0.04) or small (r = 0.14).88
2. It did this for the World Bank Chi-Square analysis finding potential
effects ranged from small to nearly medium (r = 0.25 and 0.24).89
3. It also did this for the OECD ANOVA, even though two of the effect
sizes were less than small (r = 0.01) and the third effect (for the effect
of a presiding arbitrator) was a bit more than small (r = 0.14).90
4. Finally, it did this for the World Bank ANOVA and found a less than
small effect for the status of the presiding arbitrator (r = 0.09), but
closer to medium potential effects for the respondent’s development
status (r = 0.29) and the interaction (r = 0.19).91
Although the results from every single model failed to reject the null
hypothesis—namely that there was no link between outcome and development
at the macro level—statistics offer lawyers a unique gift. Namely, even when
we cannot find a statistically significant effect, presuming that the effect might
actually exist, quantitative analysis permits the estimation of the magnitude of
a potential effect. This is done with effect sizes, which describe the relative
importance of an effect (i.e., how closely the variables are likely associated).92
In other words, even if the analyses cannot demonstrate a reliable relationship
among variables, it is still possible to estimate—presuming the effect exists—
how big the effect is likely to be.93
87

Van Harten, YB Contribution, at 18.
Franck, Harvard International article, supra note 3, at 461.
89
Id. at 463-64.
90
Id. at 466-67. There were similar effect for raw data (interaction: r = 0.17; main effect
of OECD status of respondent: r = 0.01; main effect for OECD status of presiding arbitration:
r = 0.01); and there was also a disclosure about the possibility that the interaction was
underpowered. Id. at 466 n.144.
91
Id. at 469-70. There were similar effect sizes for the raw data; and these were all
disclosed (interaction: r = 0.22; main effect of World Bank status of respondent: r = 0.12;
main effect for World Bank status of presiding arbitration: r = 0.04). Id. at 470 nn.156-58.
92
Lawless, et al., supra note 16, at 242.
93
Brett Myors, Statistical Power, in The PSYCHOLOGY RESEARCH HANDBOOK: A GUIDE
FOR GRADUATE STUDENTS AND RESEARCH ASSISTANTS 161, 163 (Frederick T. L. Leong &
88
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None of the effect sizes in the Harvard International article suggested that
development variables were likely to have a statistically large94 effect on
outcome. Moreover, only two models bordered on medium effects. The
remainder of the analyses clustered around the possibility that developmentrelated variables may have a minimal impact on outcome. The failure to
appreciate the information from effect sizes and the isolated focus on
significance tests means that the Yearbook Contribution ignored a key point.
Even if a larger sample might detect a reliable link between outcome and
development related variables, the impact is likely to be statistically small.95
C.

Recognizing Results, Appreciating Limitations and Disagreeing with
Inferences

Should one wish to disagree with the Harvard International article’s
interpretation of the results, one may do so. Likewise, if one disagrees with
the normative suggestions that derive from those analyses—as suggested by a
Public Statement that asserts investment treaty arbitration is not “fair, [and]
independent” and advocates that governments should “refus[e] to pay
arbitration awards against them”96—we welcome the debate since this is the
value of academic freedom. No amount of normative evaluation or critique,
however, can change the underlying findings, and no amount of wishing that
the results were different can make them different. No matter how much one
might dislike or be surprised by the results, the evidence should not be
ignored. Disagreements about the results should be grounded in data and
analysis that is as transparent, reliable, valid and replicable as the original.
In the case of the Harvard International article, the results did not support
the hypothesis that there was a meaningful difference in outcome for the pre2007 population based upon the variables studied. The probabilistic inference
based upon those results was that there was likely also no effect in the current
population. To flip this slightly, even if the operating research hypothesis was
that differences in development status should be related to differences in
outcome (a normatively troubling assumption), that research hypothesis was
James T. Austin eds., 2d ed., 2006); Franck, Harvard International article, supra note 3, at
457-58.
94
This is Cohen’s convention to demarcate effect sizes. See Cohen, supra note 67; see
also ROPERT P. ABELSON, STATISTICS AS PRINCIPLED ARGUMENT 12, 46 (1995).
95
There is a possibility that even “small” effects might make a difference—a second of
time may affect whether an Olympic athlete receives a medal or not. Future research can
consider how to justify effect size distinctions over time. For research in a new area, it is
appropriate to work with established conventions until a different baseline is warranted.
96
Gus Van Harten & David Schneiderman, Public Statement on the International
Investment
Regime,
Aug.
31,
2010,
¶
8,
http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public_statement/documents/Public%20Statement.pdf.
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not supported by the data. It may be cognitively easier to hold negative beliefs
about investment arbitration, as cognitive biases97 can increase the likelihood
that people will recall recent and negative behavior—particularly negative and
extreme experiences.98 Yet cognitive preferences do not mean that
assessments based on aggregate data are wrong.
Certainly there may be unfairness in specific cases, which is precisely why
there are opportunities to challenge arbitrators for bias and why states may
find it constructive to consider the net value of investment treaty arbitration on
a country-specific basis. But, in our view, the case for rejection of the entire
system was unwarranted on the basis of the evidence available in the Harvard
International article. As the population grows and analyses evolve, this
conclusion is a legitimate basis for on-going consideration.99 If one wishes to
set aside the current evidence because it does not comport with one’s cognitive
framework, that is a choice. We prefer to acknowledge the data we have,
evaluate the results in light of their limitations, and continue to look for more
data in the search for answers in an ever-shifting world.
IV.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE FUTURE

In an effort to develop the academic discourse, this Section explores
opportunities for a constructive discussion of social science methodologies.
The authors are pleased that the Yearbook Contribution takes these issues
seriously. Given issues we have raised, we highlight areas for future
consideration related to data collection, measurement, researcher disclosures
and potential insights from synthesizing quantitative and qualitative insights.
First, the Yearbook Contribution concurs with our assessment of the need
for additional data. Nevertheless, systematic and careful data collection comes
at a remarkable cost. It would be helpful to search for independent funding in
support of research. The creation of the pre-2007 dataset was a by-product of
a small seed grant by the University of Nebraska Law College and hundreds of
hours of sweat equity invested by the researcher and research assistants. There
97

See supra notes 9-10.
Solomon E. Asch, Forming Impressions of Personality. 41 J. ABNORMAL & SOC.
PSYCH. 258 (1946); see also Tiffany A. Ito et al., Negative Information Weighs More Heavily
on the Brain: The Negativity Bias in Evaluative Categorizations. 75 J. OF PERSONALITY AND
SOC PSYCH 887 (1998); Elizabeth A. Kensinger, et al., Memory for Specific Visual Details can
be Enhanced by Negative Arousing Content. 54 J. OF MEMORY AND LANGUAGE 99 (2006);
Lara G. Chepenick, et al., The Influence of Sad Mood on Cognition, 7 EMOTION 802, 807
(2007); Carrie L. Wyland & Joseph P. Forgas, On Bad Mood and White Bears: The Effects of
Mood State on Ability to Suppress Unwanted Thoughts. 21 COGNITION & EMOTION 1513,
1518–19 (2007).
99
There may be normative reasons for targeted reform related to determinacy, coherence,
consistency and predictability of the substantive law. See, e.g., Susan D. Franck, The
Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law
Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORD. L. REV. 1521 (2005).
98
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is value in exploring how to pool resources in the creation of data to create a
useful public good. In the interim, there is value in researchers sharing data,
subject to special proprietary concerns, for legitimate research purposes.100
Beyond a single repository for data, there may be value in exploring common
protocols for the collection of data, even data from different sources.
Second, there is value in constructing and refining variables to improve the
quality of models and analysis. For example, the Harvard International
article articulated that it may be constructive to control for “the quality of
expert evidence, the nature and scope of legal representation, and submissions
by amicus curiae. Other variables affecting results may, however, be
intrinsically tied to arbitration, such as the qualities and experiences of
arbitrators.”101
Other refinements might be made, such as possible
improvements we identified for the OECD variable. Likewise, there is value
in a thoughtful discussion about creating a better proxy for the development
status of a tribunal. The literature supported an evaluation of presiding
arbitrators;102 yet creating a composite development score for the tribunal (to
reflect the overall variance) has challenges. Our hope is that thoughtful
discussion about the costs and benefits of different variables will aid the future
assessment of links between development and outcome.
Third, to enhance quality and to contextualize research, there may be value
in disclosing more information.103 In conformity with social science practices,
there should be disclosure of operational definitions for measures,
explanations of models, reporting of test results, cell counts, statements of
standard deviations and effect sizes, post hoc power analyses and a priori
power analyses. Other disclosures might relate to the identity of the
researcher(s) and assistants and motivation for conducting research. Franck
disclosed the identity of other data coders104 and her own background.105 In
the interests of full disclosure, the dataset was created to test an implicit
100
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hypothesis in the Legitimacy Crisis, namely an instinct that tribunals can and
would shift costs against parties who brought unmeritorious claims or
defenses.106 The answer, based upon the same dataset the Yearbook
Contribution critiques, contradicted the research hypothesis; and this has been
acknowledged.107 Other research, using a different dataset from 2008-09,
replicated key aspects of that costs scholarship.108 The construction of the
dataset was not designed to prove—or disprove—the presence of bias (or even
assess perceived bias). It was to assess fiscal costs in arbitration and
justifications for cost outcomes. The dataset, once created, provided the
opportunity to address other issues of public concern.
Finally, a constructive by-product of the current debate would be a
dialogue about the net costs and benefits of investment treaties and dispute
resolution mechanisms. In other words, blending insights from research
models that use quantitative and qualitative methods may prove fruitful. One
reasonable suggestion is that, not only are such insights beneficial, but they are
necessary for the considered evolution of policy.
The Yearbook Contribution seems torn about the current value of
quantitative analyses of investment arbitration.109 As generating sufficient
power to identify reliably even the small effects could require a wait of
potentially 50 years, we believe it unwise to exclude potential insights.
Quantitative scholarship offers a lens to help us understand reality more
systematically, hopefully free from cognitive biases that may disrupt our
capacity to rationally process information. But quantitative data in isolation
may create inadvertent blind spots that necessitate recognition of qualitative
experiences. Holistic understanding of a system’s operation using aggregate
data can provide insights for systemic assessment. Recognizing the system
continues to grow, the existing data and analysis did not support the
conclusion that there was a fundamental flaw in investment treaty arbitration,
at least as a function of the development status variables. But likewise, the
analyses from aggregate data did not necessarily mean that the investment
arbitration system is perfect or without flaw. Although based upon the data,
variables and models, the outcomes did not indicate systemic differences in
outcomes, there may be individual cases that are of concern. For example,
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Franck previously critiqued an award against Ecuador given the scope of the
tribunal’s substantive legal determination.110 One might imagine the specific
experiences of a repeat-player respondent may be an appropriate basis for an
individualized determination—in light of the broader framework—about
whether the risks and costs of dispute resolution are worth the benefits brought
from a treaty. Whether the system as a whole reflects those same concerns,
however, is another matter.
V.

CONCLUSION

Concerns about methodology are an integral element of academic
discussion. Scholars can, and should, take methodological concerns seriously.
We can all benefit from constructive discussions that recognize social science
norms and work to advance the evolution of knowledge through dialogue. In
order to make us better producers of and consumers of research, that
conversation should occur with an understanding of social science norms. For
this reason, it is helpful to situate the Harvard International article and the
Yearbook Contribution within those norms.
First, the Yearbook Contribution suggests that use of OECD
membership to analyze development status created unacknowledged
limitations. The Harvard International article expressly defined the measure,
identified those countries that were OECD members, recognized limitations of
the OECD measurement and cross-checked the variable using a four-category
World Bank variable. Even using Van Harten’s definition, the research results
did not change. All the results were the same. At the macro level, it was not
possible to prove a statistical link between development and outcomes of
investment treaty arbitration.
Second, the Yearbook Contribution suggests there was insufficient data
(i.e. awards) to conduct quantitative research. The research was conducted on
an entire population of public awards available before June 1, 2006; and it was
and continues to be proper to make statistical conclusions about that
population. Whether the results are replicable over time and applicable to both
public and private awards, is another matter. As research evolves, additional
evidence might increase our confidence in the results from the Harvard
International article. It is also possible that future research may reject or
suggest additional subtleties about the baseline findings in the Harvard
International article. In the interim, with is a growing population and state
sovereignty is at stake, systematically gathered and compiled data—as limited
as it is—is normatively preferable to relying upon other forms of knowledge
110
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including intuition, unverified statements by authorities or chance alone.
Third, the Harvard International article offered transparent research
methodology and identified limitations of the research. It articulated the
measures, models, research results, sample sizes, standard deviations, effect
sizes, post hoc power analyses and a priori power analyses. In more than
thirty places—including a three-page section entitled “Understanding the
Limitations of the Analysis”—the article discussed its limitations.111 The
proprietary primary dataset—with approximately 200 different variables and
20,000 pieces of data—has always been available upon request from the North
Carolina Law Review. Upon request, data was provided to other researchers,
including Professor Van Harten. In light of the reported results, transparency
of methodology and acknowledgement of limitations, the Yearbook
Contribution’s claims of “overreaching” is surprising. As every model failed
to find a link between development and outcome, the Harvard International
article’s results were framed in terms of “temper[ing] this cautious optimism
properly” to recognize the limitations and need for replication.112
Finally, the Yearbook Contribution appears concerned the Harvard
International article did not address the appearance of bias. It is correct that
the research did not address perceived bias. As initial research in a new area,
the Harvard International article instead focused on actual bias by evaluating
whether there were systemic or unexpected differences in outcomes across
categories. Although variables about perception are often subjective, by using
valid and reliable measures, future research might constructively explore
indicators of perceived bias. For example, in an effort to explore both
perceived and actual bias, it may be fruitful to explore data on arbitrator
challenges, which are derived from arbitration rules designed to address
problems of bias and partiality in actual disputes.
In an effort to take a serious subject seriously, we have sought to
identify opportunities for the future and to generate a dialogue about
improving data collection, variables for analysis and disclosure of information.
Our hope is, having recognized that careful research and informed critiques
are prudent in international economic activity, that we can move forward
constructively—with a better understanding of social science norms—in an
effort to engage in quality research and an informed normative debate.
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RESPONSE	
  TO	
  REPLY	
  
Susan D. Franck, Calvin P. Garbin and Jenna M. Perkins

In Through the Looking Glass, we explored fundamental social science
norms and considered their application to investment treaty arbitration in order
to evaluate the concerns in Professor Van Harten’s Yearbook Contribution113
related to a Harvard International Law Journal article.114 In light of the Reply
and given our belief that dialogue is a productive way to advance knowledge,
we now highlight the areas of agreement, clarify our understanding of “bias”
and consider the limitations of inferences from statistical results. We conclude
by emphasizing that all research methods—whether empirical or otherwise—
have limits, but the inevitable limitations that come with a quantitative
evaluation of international investment law should not be invoked to inhibit
serious, careful and methodologically sound research.
There is important common ground among all of the authors involved
in the dialogue. First, all authors appear to agree that research of investment
treaty arbitration is both relevant115 and worthy of ongoing inquiry.116 Second,
all authors agree that construct validity—how we define social constructs,
including the meaning of Development Status—is worthy of thoughtful
discussion.117 We cannot, will not and did not suggest that the definition of
OECD is the exclusive method for evaluating Development Status. This was
why the Harvard International article identified concerns related to Mexico
and replicated the analysis using a different measure, namely the World
Bank’s own classification.118 The bottom line is, irrespective of how we
defined a respondent’s Development Status, at the macro level there was no
statistically significant difference between the outcomes for different types of
113
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respondent states. Third, all authors appear to agree that there is no reliable
empirical evidence, either in the Harvard International article or elsewhere,
that the international investment law system exhibits actual bias in arbitration
outcomes against developing countries. Professor Van Harten has not provided
any holistic empirical analysis, with sound ex ante research methodology,
demonstrating that investment treaty arbitration outcomes exhibit a systemic
bias against developing countries. Evidence of the presence or absence of
actual bias is, of course, important in evaluating whether perceptions of bias
are reasonable in the circumstances.
To that end, it may be constructive to clarify our definition of “bias”.
For the purposes of quantitative analysis, bias involves considering whether—
during the critical process of rendering an arbitral award—outcomes exhibited
systemic differences for variables of interest. The objective was to look at
actual awards to search for verifiable indicators of bias in real case outcomes.
The Harvard International article and Through the Looking Glass used
significance testing (and the intertwined consideration of effect sizes) to
explore whether there were meaningful and reliable differences in outcomes
across different development-based categories. Put in a more colloquial way,
by narrowing the empirical microscope to focus on development, the research
explored whether Development Status affected outcomes such that investment
treaty arbitration was the statistical equivalent of tossing a two-headed coin.
Hoping that rule of law adjudicative systems do not create rigged
outcomes, the research hypothesis was the same as the null hypothesis,
namely: there would be no reliable relationship between development
variables and outcome. The research hypothesis also could have taken one of
two different forms: (1) there would be a systemic difference in arbitration
outcomes that worked to the detriment of the developed world, or (2) there
would be a systemic difference in arbitration outcomes that worked to the
detriment of the developing world. Even if one of those two alternatives had
been adopted as the research hypothesis, the results of the statistical tests
would have all been the same. For every single one of the twenty-four models
analyzed in the Harvard International article and Through the Looking Glass,
there was no evidence of substantial or significant statistical differences at the
macro level for Development Status. Even if we had asserted that the system
exhibited bias, the results would not have supported that position.
As with other forms of knowledge acquisition, making inferences from
statistical evidence inevitably involves risk. Professor Van Harten correctly
says that the failure to find lack of bias in one model does not necessarily
mean that investment treaty arbitration is completely free of bias. Inferences
can only be made about the variables analyzed, like the development variables
we explored. It is also notoriously difficult to prove a negative. Statistical
tests, designed to provide reliable evidence of difference, cannot conclusively
prove equivalence; but they offer useful evidence about the possibility of a
lack of a difference.
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This makes Van Harten’s analogy apt, namely: looking for bias in
investment treaty arbitration may be the equivalent of looking for pliers in a
messy garage.119 Both situations are complex and may cause frustration. One
may wish to find the object one desires, whether a pair of pliers in a garage or
bias in investment treaty arbitration. But when one explores the traditional
locations where a reasonable observer would expect to find the pliers—such as
the tool bench where the pliers were last used, in the drawer where the pliers
are usually stored, or on the floor in between the bench and the drawer—that
may be useful initial evidence that the pliers are likely not in the garage.
Likewise, when research explores the most obvious aspects of bias (such as
bias against the developing world claimed by a head of state) and it cannot be
found, that is valuable evidence. While we cannot definitively claim to know
about the location of pliers (or the existence of bias), the empirical enquiry can
begin to minimize the uncertainty.
All models of knowledge are inevitably limited, and empirical
methodologies are no exception. While we can never eliminate all risk of
error given the probabilistic nature of empirical enquiry, we can increase our
confidence in the results through replication. The research initiated thus far is
a starting point—not an ending point. Social scientists and methodologists
spend major portions of their professional careers debating research, seeking
ways to improve measures and models and considering the finer points of
inference. It is a pleasure to see that empirical research on investment
arbitration has already reached this advanced stage even at such a nascent
phase of its evolution. This discussion has been an illuminating opportunity to
consider ways to improve upon initial good-faith research efforts designed to
answer an important question about international investment law. Professor
Van Harten has usefully pointed out the complexity of measuring constructs
and of processing the data to produce a meaningful and trustworthy
conclusion, especially given the limited data available. However, it is
important to note the convergence of the results from the many alternatives
that were explored. At present, from these analyses of these data, there is no
consistent evidence supporting a conclusion of substantial bias in arbitration
decisions. Empirically based discussions of consistent and substantial
research should continue, both with additional analysis of the pre-2007 data
and additional data from the evolving population. The issues at stake are too
important to do anything less.
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Appendix I
References to Research Limitations in Franck (2009)
1. “Part V describes the initial results and explains the research
limitations.”120
2. “It cautions, however, that proper contextualization and replication of
the research is necessary.”121
3. “Part V.E then describes the limitations of the research.”122
4. “Third, recognizing the limited nature of the inferences, the research
can provide information to stakeholders, such as government officials
negotiating treaties, who may wish to consider the potential
implications for the design of their dispute resolution systems.”123
5. “Recognizing the limitations of the research, this Part argues that
reform has the benefit of promoting procedural legitimacy by
addressing concerns related to perceptions about the system’s
fairness.”124
6. “By measuring the potential strength of a relationship between two
variables, effect sizes aid assessment of whether, on a normative level,
the size of a reliable statistical difference is a matter of practical
concern or is so tiny as to be irrelevant.”125
7. “Finally, section E describes the limitations of the analyses and related
inferences.”126
8. “The underlying data has limitations given that it comes from publicly
available archives and dates only to June 1, 2006. There are now
approximately three more years of data to collect and analyze. It is
necessary to acknowledge this limitation, and future research should
replicate the analyses.”127
120

Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50
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9. “As the two statistically significant pairwise comparisons involve these
countries, inferences from the data are limited.”128
10. “The effect sizes also suggest that further research is warranted. Many
analyses did not achieve statistical significance and had effect sizes
that were so tiny as to be of little practical effect.”129
11. “Out of extra caution in this sensitive area, it would therefore be
prudent to engage in more research, with a larger sample, before
establishing a population parameter that development status is not
reliably associated with outcome.”130
12. “Given that the data did not suggest a reliable link between
development status and outcome, the evidence begins to suggest that
the investment treaty arbitration system appears to be functioning
reasonably well at the macro level.”131
13. “The presence of two statistically significant simple effects in the
amounts awarded, however, suggests tempering this ‘good news,’ as
certain permutations merit further reflection.”132
14. “First and foremost, further research is necessary to replicate these
findings to assess whether they are real population parameters or the
result of statistical chance.”133
15. “First, there may be limitations to the strength of the inferences, as
they may not reflect population parameters.”134
16. “Replication with expanded data is necessary to avoid establishing a
population parameter that may be due to chance alone.”135
17. “Second, there may be issues about the validity of the statistical
conclusions. Effect sizes suggest that the power of the research is
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

Id. at 472.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 473.
Id.
Id. at 474.
Id.
Id. at 475.
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relatively low. It would be prudent to establish a broader pool of data,
based on a priori power analysis, to confirm, clarify, contradict, or
supplement these findings.”136
18. “This means that there would be utility in replicating and expanding
this research by using more complicated models and additional
variables to refine both the research questions and the statistical
conclusions.”137
19. “Since there is now nearly three additional years’ worth of data to
gather and analyze, future research should replicate the analysis.”138
20. “Additional control variables could minimize the risk of statistical
confounds. For example, given the limited and missing data in the
present database, it was not possible to control for variables such as
differences between amounts claimed versus amounts awarded. Future
research might have enough data to usefully add this factor and
consider other variables such as the number of arbitrators, the gender
of arbitrators, the institutions administering the arbitrations, and the
identity of lawyers representing the parties.”139
21. “This makes future research challenging but does not diminish the
importance of replication and convergence. As the data pool expands,
analysis will be possible, but it is important to recognize the potential
limitations of its statistical power.”140
22. “The theme from the present research suggests creating targeted
adjustments when there is a valid and reliable diagnostic demonstrating
the value of such modifications, while recognizing the possible
limitations when implementing policy changes.”141
23. “Despite this general cautiously good news, however, there are areas
for improvement and prudence. Section B therefore explores various
opportunities stakeholders may take to improve investment treaty
dispute resolution, and section C suggests areas of caution so that
counsel and arbitrators can take even greater care during the
adjudicative process to promote procedural justice.”142
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

Id.
Id.
Id. at 475.
Id. at 475 n.176.
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24. “The results suggest that it is necessary to temper this cautious
optimism properly. Empirical diagnosis found two simple effects
where presiding arbitrators from the developing world made larger
awards against developing countries and smaller awards against
developed countries. Also, while not statistically significant and
potentially affected by statistical outliers, there was a phenomenon
whereby tribunals with arbitrators from developed countries rendered
higher awards against respondents from the developed world, whereas
tribunals with presiding arbitrators from the developing world rendered
higher awards against countries from the developing world.”143
25. “While they bear watching and are worthy of replication, the initial
results suggest that there may be areas that require—or would simply
benefit from—targeted interventions to improve the design of future
dispute resolution systems.”144
26. “First, it means that there are reasonable concerns about the reliability
of the statistical conclusions—namely that tribunals with presiding
arbitrators from Middle Income countries treat countries differently on
the basis of their development background.”145
27. “This research, particularly if replicated, creates a strong case for the
creation of an appellate body or even a stand-alone investment
court.”146
28.

“The notion that outcome is not associated with arbitrator or
respondent development status should be a basis for cautious
optimism. It provides evidence about the integrity of arbitration and
casts doubt on the assumption that arbitrators from developed states
show a bias in terms of arbitration outcomes or that the development
status of respondent states affect such outcomes.” 147

29. “The lack of a reliable relationship between development status and
out- come suggests that other variables or combinations of variables
may drive arbitration results. Some of these variables may be
completely disassociated from the arbitration process. Possible
143
144
145
146
147
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Id, at 487.
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variables could include those traditionally associated with neutral,
adjudicative forums, whether courts, claims, commissions, or
arbitrations, such as the quality of expert evidence, the nature and
scope of legal representation, and submissions by amicus curiae. . . .
Future research might usefully assess the impact of these and other
variables in order to gain a more nuanced understanding of factors that
are reliably associated with outcome. ”148
30. “While the general initial results are encouraging, one should
contextualize them properly, given their limitations.”149
31. “Even if the results are not replicable . . . the critical message from the
initial results is clear, namely that more empirical research is needed to
examine development issues in greater detail and consider how best to
enhance the integrity of the dispute resolution process.”150
32. “This Article suggests that while there may be some problems with
arbitration, it is not clear that a development divide affects outcomes.
However, this is subject to evolution based upon new research.” 151

148
149
150
151
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Appendix II: Adjusting for Transformations and
Net Present Value in Amounts Awarded
We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer who encouraged us to explore
certain methodological concerns about ways to minimize skewing of data and
the implications of the time value of money. This Appendix explores those
technical considerations in detail.
I. TRANSFORMING DATA AND MINIMIZING SKEWNESS
The Harvard International article identified the need to run multiple
versions of a model to ensure that the results were robust. It analyzed both
raw and winzorized data.152
Winsorising is a standard practice in psychology research.153 The
objective of winsorizing is to increase the symmetry of a distribution, decrease
the skewness and while retaining information about real cases within a dataset.
It first requires isolating the 25th percentile or above the 75th percentile of the
values in the dataset (commonly called Tukey’s Hinges). Extreme cases are
then identified using a calculation to identify the upper and lower bounds of
the inter-quartile distribution.154 Rather than eliminating the outliers,
winsorizing reassigns the extreme values to a value that is the same as the
closest non-extreme observation.155 In the Harvard International article, this
meant that for the seven awards that were deemed outliers, the “winsorized”
value of the award was the equivalent of the dataset’s upper-bound, namely
US$5,675,537.50. All other awards retained their original value.
Prior to Franck conducting the analyses that lead to the Harvard
International article, all of the authors agreed that using winsorized data
152
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would be preferable to analyzing raw or trimmed data in isolation. For the
population of investment arbitration awards, winsorizing data kept the amount
awarded in a scale that people can understand (namely US dollar values),
reduced skewing and retained real case data from the pre-2007 population.
The skewness of amounts awarded in the pre-2007 dataset was: (1) raw data =
5.311; (2) trimmed data = 2.437; and (3) winsorized data = 1.414.156 Although
the raw data reflected real dollars awarded, its skewing (over 5.0) meant it
could not be analyzed in isolation. The high skewing of the trimmed data also
decreased its analytical value. The lower skewing (i.e. closer to 0.0) for the
winsorized data meant that its use was preferable.
There are additional ways to minimize asymmetries including log, square
root and inverse transformations.157 The objective of the transformations is to
obtain a skewness that is acceptably close to zero.158 Although the
transformed data is not in an easily understandable scale (i.e. not U.S.
Dollars), the transformations exhibited various levels of skewness: (1) square
root = 3.734, (2) log = 0.506, and (3) inverse = -0.404. As both the log and
inverse transformations had values closer to zero, those transformations
provide an opportunity to re-analyze the data and evaluate the robustness of
the Harvard International models.
We replicated the analyses on page 465 of the Harvard International
article to explore the OECD-based model using both the log and transformed
data. Irrespective of whether log or inverse transformations were used, none
of the analyses revealed any statistically significant effects. For example,
using the log transformations, there was no statistically significant interaction
among the OECD status of the respondent, the OECD status of the presiding
arbitrator and the amounts tribunals awarded (F (1,45) = 0.070; p = 0.79; r =
0.04; n = 49).159 Likewise, the log data did not identify a statistically
156
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significant relationship between the OECD status of the respondent and
amounts awarded (F (1,45) = 0.030; p = 0.86; r = 0.03; n = 49).160 Also, there
was statistically significant relationship between having a tribunal with a
presiding arbitrator from an OECD member and amounts awarded (F (1,45) =
1.280; p = 0.26; r = 0.17; n = 49).161 None of the tests, which used data with
minimal skewing, identified a statistically significant relationship between
OECD-based variables and amounts awarded. Moreover, the possible size of
the effects studied were either less than small or small.162 The congruity in
results—particularly in log transformed data and inversely transformed data
with minimal skewing—demonstrates the OECD-based models and results in
the Harvard International article were robust.
Likewise, we replicated the analyses on page 468 of the Harvard
International article to consider whether the World Bank-based model
exhibited different results. Once again, irrespective of whether log or inverse
transformations were used, there were no statistically significant relationships.
Using the log data, there was no statistically significant interaction with the
World Bank status of the respondent, the World Bank classification of the
presiding arbitrator and amounts awarded (F (3,41) = 0.72; p = 0.55; r = 0.22;
n = 49).163 The log data also failed to reveal a reliable relationship between
the World Bank status of a respondent state and the amounts awarded (F
(3,41) = 1.115; p = 0.35; r = 0.28; n = 49).164 Similarly, the log data failed to
1,562 awards, both of which could take decades.
160
For the inverse transformation, there was no main effect for respondent’s OECD status
(F (1,45) = 0.102; p = 0.75; r = 0.05; n = 49). Given the less than small effect sizes for the
interactions based upon the log (r = 0.03) and the inverse (r = 0.05), the power of those
models are less than 0.20, which suggests an 80% risk of error.
161
For the inverse transformation, there was no significant main effect for the presiding
arbitrator’s OECD status (F (1,45) = 1.468; p = 0.23; r = 0.18; n = 49). The power of the
model using log data was 0.20, and the power for the transformed data was 0.30. Given the
less than small effect sizes for the interactions using the log (r = 0.03) and inverse (r = 0.05),
the power of those models was less than 0.20, which suggests an 80% risk of error. Yet the
results may not be a function of pure power given the less than small effect size. See supra
note 159.
162
Appendix II adopts the same definitions of small, medium and large effects that were
used by Jacob Cohen and described in Through the Looking Glass, supra at 13, n.67.
163
For the inverse transformation, there was no significant interaction (F (3,41) = 0.751; p
= 0.53; r = 0.23; n = 49). Given the small to medium effect sizes for the interactions based
upon the log (r = 0.22) and the inverse (r = 0.23), the power of those models was 0.30, which
suggests a 70% risk of a Type II error and a need for replication before drawing definitive
conclusions about the current population.
164
For the inverse transformation, there was no significant main effect for the World
Bank classification of the respondent (F (3,41) = 0.990; p = 0.41; r = 0.26; n = 49). The
power of these analyses ranged from 0.40-0.50, which indicates a 50-60% risk of a Type II
error. As the effect sizes bordered on medium, replication is warranted before drawing

36

[draft-not for citation]

show a reliable link between the World Bank classification of the presiding
arbitrator and the amounts awarded (F (1,41) = 0.080; p = 0.78; r = 0.14; n =
49).165 None of the World Bank based models were able to identify a
statistically significant relationship between World Bank-based classifications
and amounts awarded. Like the analyses on winsorized data in the Harvard
International article, many of the effect sizes were small or less than small,
but the effect for a respondent’s World Bank status bordered on mediumsized. The congruity in results demonstrates the models and results in the
Harvard International article were robust.
II. ADJUSTING FOR THE TIME VALUE OF MONEY
The Harvard International article analyzed the actual amounts awarded in
a case using the raw amount awarded on the date of the award. Given the
variations in the size of amounts awarded at different times, the Harvard
International article did not adjust for inflation.
A reasonable research hypothesis is that even adjusting for time value of
money, the results of the statistical analyses would not result in a meaningfully
different outcome as, for those awards where the tribunals made an award in
favor of the investor, there was a mix of awards over the dataset’s time period.
For example, in the five lowest awards when the tribunals made awards in
favor of investors, there was a range of awards over time: (1) Iurii Bogdanov,
Agurdino-Invest Ltd. and Agurdino-Chimia JSC v. Republic of Moldova:
September 25, 2005 for US$24,603; (2) Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain:
November 13, 2000 for US$155,314; (3) Pope & Talbot v. Canada: May 31,
2002 for US$407,646; (4) Asian Agricultural Products v. Sri Lanka for
US$460,000; and (5) Fexdax v. Venezuela: March 9, 1998 for US$598,950.
Similarly, for the five highest awards in the dataset, there was a range of
awards over time: (1) American Manufacturing and Trading v. Zaire: Feb 21,
1997 for US$9,000,000; (2) Metalclad v. Mexico: August 30, 2000 for
$16,685,000; (3) Occidental Exploration and Production v. Ecuador, July 1,
2004 for US$71,533,549; (4) CMS Gas Transmission v. Argentina, May 12,
2005 for US$133,200,000; and (5) CME Czech Republic BV v. Czech
Republic, March 14, 2003 for US$269,814,000.
In an effort to explore the empirical question of whether adjusting for
definitive conclusions about the lack of an effect in the current population.
165
For the inverse transformation, there was no significant main effect on amounts
awarded based upon the presiding arbitrator’s World Bank classification (F (1,41) = 0.060; p
= 0.81; r = 0.04; n = 49). Given the small effect size for the log (r = 0.14) and the less than
small effect size for the inverse (r = 0.04) data, the power of the analyses was 0.20 or lower.
For the small effect, this indicates an 80% risk of a Type II error and the need for replication
before drawing conclusive inferences beyond the dataset studied.

Understanding Social Science Norms

37

inflation makes a difference, we first considered how best to adjust the actual
amounts awarded. We decided to adjust the amounts awarded according to
two different pre-existing indexes to see if derivative adjustment changed the
results of the analyses. First, we selected the Consumer Price Index (CPI),
which is a standard adjustment for inflation and based upon the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics. As investment arbitration is not necessarily about U.S.
consumer prices, the second index we selected was based upon Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. Using these two different indexes, we
converted the amount of the award from the date it was made (awards ranged
from the 1990 to 2006) into 2006 U.S. dollars.
Using these adjusted values, we replicated the analyses on pages 465 and
468 of the Harvard International article. None of the analyses—irrespective
of whether CPI-adjusted or GDP-adjusted data was used—revealed a
statistically significant difference in mean amounts awarded as a function of
development-related variables studied. It did not matter whether an OECD or
World Bank based model was used. It did not matter which dependent
variable was used to consider the effects of skewing within the data. For
every analysis we ran to adjust for inflation, there was no relationship between
development variables and amounts awarded. Even with the limitation of low
power, this demonstrates that the models and results in the Harvard
International article were robust.
A.

OECD Based Models: CPI and GDP Adjusted Amounts
Awarded

We first considered the OECD-based models using the CPI-adjusted
values for awards. Given the concerns identified above, we first considered
the skewness of the CPI-adjusted data. To replicate the Harvard International
article and include variables with decreased skewness, we selected: (1) raw
CPI-adjusted, (2) winsorized CPI-adjusted, (3) log CPI-adjusted, and (4)
inverse CPI-adjusted data for analysis.166 None of these different models
revealed a statistically significant link between the OECD-based constructs of
development and the amounts awarded. First, using the log transformation for
CPI-adjusted amounts, there was no interaction among the OECD status of the
respondent state, the OECD status of the presiding arbitrator and amounts
awarded (F (1,45) = 0.068; p = 0.80; r = 0.04; n = 49).167 Second, there was
166

The skewness of the CPI-adjusted amounts awarded was as follows: (1) raw = 5.421,
(2) trimmed = 2.437, (3) winsorized = 1.424; (4) square root = 3.725, (5) log = 0.503, and (6)
inverse = -0.404.
167
The power of the interaction was less than 0.20. Given the non-significant results and
less than small effect size, the failure to identify a significant result may not purely be a
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no statistically significant relationship between being an OECD respondent
and amounts awarded (F (1,45) = 0.028; p = 0.87; r = 0.02; n = 49).168 Third,
there was no statistically significant relationship between having a presiding
arbitrator from an OECD country and the amounts awarded (F (1,45) = 1.296;
p = 0.26; r = 0.17; n = 49).169 The results from the raw CPI-adjusted data
were similar.170 Likewise, the results from the winsorized171 CPI-adjusted
data and the inverse transformation172 of the CPI-adjusted data failed to reveal
any statistically significant results.
function of power. See supra note 159.
168
The power of the main effect of the respondent’s OECD status was less than 0.20.
Given the non-significant results and the less than small effect size, the failure to identify a
statistically significant difference may not purely be a function of power. See supra note 159.
169
The power of the main effect of the presiding arbitrator’s OECD status was 0.20.
Given 80% risk of a Type II error, replication is warranted before making strong inferences
beyond the pre-2007 population.
170
There was no statistically significant interaction with OECD status of the respondent,
OECD status of the presiding arbitrator and amounts awarded (F (1,45) = 1.338; p = 0.25; r =
0.17; n = 49). There was no statistically significant relationship with the OECD status of the
respondent and amounts awarded (F (1,45) < 0.001; p = 0.99; r = < 0.01; n = 49). There was
also no statistically significant relationship between having a presiding arbitrator from an
OECD state and amounts awarded (F (1,45) = 0.003; p = 0.96; r = 0.01; n = 49). For the
interaction, with a small effect, low power of 0.20 and an 80% risk of a Type II error,
replication is warranted before making conclusions regarding the current population. For the
two main effects with less than small effect sizes (power less than 0.20), the failure to identify
a statistically significant difference may not purely be a function of power. See supra note
159.
171
For the winsorized data, there was no statistically significant interaction with OECD
status of the respondent, OECD status of the presiding arbitrator and amounts awarded (F
(1,45) = 0.003; p = 0.95; r < 0.01; n = 49). There was no statistically significant relationship
with the OECD status of the respondent and amounts awarded (F (1,45) < 0.001; p = 0.99; r =
< 0.01; n = 49). There was also no statistically significant relationship between having a
presiding arbitrator from an OECD state and amounts awarded (F (1,45) = 0.849; p = 0.36; r =
0.14; n = 49). For the main effect of a presiding arbitrator’s OECD status, with a small effect,
low power of 0.20 and an 80% risk of a Type II error, replication is warranted before making
conclusions regarding the current population. For the other two effects with less than small
effect sizes (power was less than 0.20), the failure to identify a statistically significant
difference may not purely be a function of power. See supra note 159.
172
For the inverse transformations on CPI-adjusted data, there was no statistically
significant interaction with OECD status of the respondent, OECD status of the presiding
arbitrator and amounts awarded (F (1,45) = 0.329; p = 0.57; r = 0.09; n = 49). There was no
statistically significant relationship with the OECD status of the respondent and amounts
awarded (F (1,45) = 0.102; p = 0.75; r = 0.05; n = 49). There was also no statistically
significant relationship between having a presiding arbitrator from an OECD state and
amounts awarded (F (1,45) = 1.468; p = 0.23; r = 0.18; n = 49). For the main effect of a
presiding arbitrator’s OECD status, with a small effect, low power of 0.20-0.30 and a 70-80%
risk of a Type II error, replication is warranted before making conclusions regarding the
current population. For the other two effects with less than small effect sizes (power was less
than 0.20), the failure to identify a statistically significant difference may not purely be a
function of power. See supra note 159.
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We then repeated our work on the OECD-based models using the GDPadjusted values. Again, to replicate the Harvard International article using a
measure with decreased skewness, we selected (1) raw GDP-adjusted, (2)
winsorized GDP-adjusted, (3) log GDP-adjusted, and (4) inverse GDPadjusted data for analysis.173 As with the CPI-adjusted values discussed
above, when the analyses of the GDP-adjusted amounts awarded failed to
reflect a statistically significant relationship between OECD-based
development variables and outcome.
First, using GDP-adjusted log
transformations, there was no interaction among the OECD status of the
respondent state, the OECD status of the presiding arbitrator and amounts
awarded (F (1,45) = 0.067; p = 0.78; r = 0.04; n = 49).174 Second, there was
no statistically significant relationship between being an OECD respondent
and amounts awarded (F (1,45) = 0.028; p = 0.87; r = 0.05; n = 49).175 Third,
there was no statistically significant relationship between having a presiding
arbitrator from an OECD country and the amounts awarded (F (1,45) = 1.304;
p = 0.26; r = 0.17; n = 49).176 As with the CPI-adjusted analyses, when
adjusting for GDP, irrespective of whether we used raw data,177 winsorized
data178 or inverse transformations,179 the models failed to reveal any
173

The skewness of the GDP-adjusted amounts awarded was as follows: (1) raw = 5.493,
(2) trimmed = 2.236, (3) winsorized = 1.421; (4) square root = 3.723, (5) log = 0.501, and (6)
inverse = -0.404.
174
The power of the GDP adjusted interaction was less than 0.20. Given the nonsignificant results and less than small effect size, the results may not be a function of power.
See supra note 159.
175
The power of the main effect of the respondent’s OECD status using GDP adjusted
amounts was less than 0.20. Given the non-significant results and less than small effect size it
is not clear that the failure to identify a relationship is a function of power. See supra note 159.
176
As with the CPI adjusted amounts, for the GDP adjusted log, the power of the main
effect of the presiding arbitrator’s OECD status was 0.20. Given the 80% risk of a Type II
error, replication is warranted before making strong inferences beyond the pre-2007
population.
177
For the raw GDP adjusted data, there was no statistically significant interaction with
OECD status of the respondent, OECD status of the presiding arbitrator and amounts awarded
(F (1,45) = 1.318; p = 0.26; r = 0.17; n = 49). There was no statistically significant
relationship with the OECD status of the respondent and amounts awarded (F (1,45) < 0.001;
p = 0.99; r = < 0.01; n = 49). There was also no statistically significant relationship between
having a presiding arbitrator from an OECD state and amounts awarded (F (1,45) = 0.001; p =
0.97; r = 0.01; n = 49). For the interaction, with a small effect, low power of 0.20 and an 80%
risk of a Type II error, replication is warranted before making definitive conclusions. For the
two main effects with less than small effect sizes (power less than 0.20), the results may not
be attributable to power problems. See supra note 159.
178
For the winsorized GDP adjusted data, there was no statistically significant interaction
with OECD status of the respondent, OECD status of the presiding arbitrator and amounts
awarded (F (1,45) = 0.009; p = 0.92; r < 0.01; n = 49). There was no statistically significant
relationship with the OECD status of the respondent and amounts awarded (F (1,45) = 0.002;
p = 0.96; r = 0.01; n = 49). There was also no statistically significant relationship between
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meaningful difference among the OCED-based variables and amounts
awarded.
B.

World Bank Based Models: CPI and GDP Adjusted
Amounts Awarded

We then replicated the World Bank-based models using the CPI-adjusted
values using the four CPI-adjusted variables described in Part A. As with the
OECD-based model, none of the World Bank analyses revealed any
statistically significant relationships between the World-Bank based variables
and the CPI-adjusted amounts awarded. First, using the log transformation for
CPI-adjusted amounts, there was no interaction among the World Bank status
of the respondent state, the World Bank status of the presiding arbitrator and
amounts awarded (F (3,41) = 0.711; p = 0.55; r = 0.13; n = 49).180 Second,
using log transformation, there was no statistically significant relationship
between a respondent’s World Bank classification and amounts awarded (F
(3,41) = 1.108; p = 0.38; r = 0.16; n = 49).181 Third, there was no statistically
significant relationship between having a presiding arbitrator from a High or
Middle Income country and amounts awarded (F (1,41) = 0.087; p = 0.77; r =
0.04; n = 49).182 The World Bank results from the raw CPI-adjusted data were

having a presiding arbitrator from an OECD state and amounts awarded (F (1,45) = 0.835; p =
0.37; r = 0.14; n = 49). For the main effect of a presiding arbitrator’s OECD status, with a
small effect, low power of 0.20 and an 80% risk of a Type II error, replication is warranted
before making conclusions regarding the current population. For the other two effects with
less than small effect sizes (power was less than 0.20), the failure to identify a statistically
significant difference may not purely be a function of power. See supra note 159.
179
For the inverse transformations on GDP-adjusted data, there was no statistically
significant interaction with OECD status of the respondent, OECD status of the presiding
arbitrator and amounts awarded (F (1,45) = 0.329; p = 0.57; r = 0.09; n = 49). There was no
statistically significant relationship with the OECD status of the respondent and amounts
awarded (F (1,45) = 0.102; p = 0.75; r = 0.05; n = 49). There was also no statistically
significant relationship between having a presiding arbitrator from an OECD state and
amounts awarded (F (1,45) = 1.468; p = 0.23; r = 0.18; n = 49). For the main effect of a
presiding arbitrator’s OECD status, with a small effect, low power of between 0.20-0.30 and a
70-80% risk of a Type II error, replication is warranted before making conclusions regarding
the current population. For the two less than small effects (power less than 0.20), the failure
to identify a statistically significant difference may not purely be a function of power. See
supra note 159.
180
With the small effect (r = 0.13), low power of 0.20 and an 80% risk of a Type II error,
replication is warranted before making conclusions regarding the current population.
181
With the small effect (r = 0.16), low power of 0.20 and an 80% risk of a Type II error,
replication is warranted before making conclusions regarding the current population.
182
The power of the main effect of presiding arbitrators World Bank classification was
less than 0.20. Given the non-significant results and the less than small effect size, the failure
to identify a statistically significant difference is necessarily a function of power. See supra
note 159.
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similar.183 Likewise, the results from the CPI-adjusted winsorized184 data and
inverse transformations185 failed to reveal any statistically significant results in
the World Bank-based models.
Finally, we replicated the World Bank-based models using the four GDPadjusted values described in Part A. Like the other analyses, the results failed
to identify a statistically significant relationship with World Bank-based
development variables and the GDP-adjusted amounts awarded. First, using
the log transformation for GDP-adjusted amounts, there was no interaction
among the World Bank status of the respondent state, the World Bank status
of the presiding arbitrator and amounts awarded (F (3,41) = 0.704; p = 0.56; r
= 0.22; n = 49).186 Second, using log transformations, there was no
183

There was no statistically significant interaction with World Bank status of the
respondent, World Bank status of the presiding arbitrator and amounts awarded (F (3,41) =
0.688; p = 0.56; r = 0.22; n = 49). There was no statistically significant relationship with the
World Bank status of the respondent and amounts awarded (F (3,41) = 0.173; p = 0.91; r =
0.11; n = 49). There was also no statistically significant relationship between a presiding
arbitrator’s World Bank classification and amounts awarded (F (1,41) = 0.060; p = 0.81; r =
0.04; n = 49). For the main effect of the presiding arbitrator, with less than small effect size
and low power (less than 0.20), the failure to identify a significant difference may not purely
be a function of power See supra note 159. The interaction, however, was underpowered (less
than 0.20 for small effect); and the main effect of the respondent’s development status
exhibited low power (0.30). The resulting 70-80% risk of a Type II error for those models
indicates replication is warranted before making conclusions beyond the pre-2007 population.
184
For the winsorized data, there was no statistically significant interaction with World
Bank status of the respondent, World Bank status of the presiding arbitrator and amounts
awarded (F (3,41) = 0.518; p = 0.67; r = 0.19; n = 49). There was no statistically significant
relationship with the World Bank status of the respondent and amounts awarded (F (3,41) =
1.246; p = 0.31; r = 0.29; n = 49). There was also no statistically significant relationship
between having a High or Middle Income presiding arbitrator and amounts awarded (F (1,41)
= 0.392; p = 0.53; r = 0.10; n = 49). As all of these models had small or a medium effect, the
power of the analyses was less than 0.20 (r = 0.10), 0.30 (r = 0.19) and in the range of 0.500.60 (r = 0.29). Given the risk of a Type II error, replication is warranted before making
conclusions regarding the current population.
185
For the inverse transformations on CPI-adjusted data, there was no statistically
significant interaction with World Bank of the respondent, World Bank status of the presiding
arbitrator and amounts awarded (F (3,41) = 0.751; p = 0.53; r = 0.23; n = 49). There was no
statistically significant relationship with the World Bank status of the respondent and amounts
awarded (F (3,41) = 0.990; p = 0.41; r = 0.26; n = 49). There was also no statistically
significant relationship between a presiding arbitrator’s World Bank status and amounts
awarded (F (1,41) = 0.060; p = 0.81; r = 0.04; n = 49). For the main effect of a presiding
arbitrator’s World Bank status, with a less than small effect and non-significant result, the
failure to identify a relationship may not just be a function of power. See supra note 159. As
the two other effects, however, have low power (0.30-0.40), the 60-70% risk of a Type II error
warrants replication before making conclusions beyond the current dataset.
186
With the small-medium effect (r = 0.22), low power of 0.30 and a 70% risk of a Type
II error, replication is warranted before making conclusions regarding the current population.
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statistically significant relationship between a respondent’s World Bank
classification and amounts awarded (F (3,41) = 1.105; p = 0.36; r = 0.27; n =
49).187 Third, the last log transformation of GDP-adjusted data identified no
statistically significant relationship between having a presiding arbitrator from
a High or Middle Income country and amounts awarded (F (1,41) = 0.090; p =
0.76; r = 0.09; n = 49).188 As with the CPI-adjusted analyses, when adjusting
for GDP, irrespective of whether we used raw data,189 winsorized data190 or
inverse transformations,191 the models failed to reveal any meaningful
difference among the World Bank-based variables and amounts awarded.

187

With a nearly medium effect (r = 0.27), power of 0.40 and a 60% risk of a Type II
error, replication is warranted before making conclusions regarding the current population.
188
The power of the main effect of presiding arbitrators World Bank classification was
less than 0.20. Given the non-significant results and the less than small effect size, the failure
to identify a statistically significant difference may not purely be a function of power. See
supra note 159.
189
For the raw GDP adjusted data, there was no statistically significant interaction with
World Bank status of the respondent, World Bank status of the presiding arbitrator and
amounts awarded (F (3,41) = 0.668; p = 0.58; r = 0.22; n = 49). There was no statistically
significant relationship with the World Bank status of the respondent and amounts awarded (F
(3,41) = 0.160; p = 0.92; r = 0.11; n = 49). There was also no statistically significant
relationship between having a presiding arbitrator from a High or Middle Income state and
amounts awarded (F (1,41) = 0.052; p = 0.82; r = 0.04; n = 49). For the less than small effect
of the presiding arbitrator’s World Bank status, the results may not be attributable to a power
problem. However, given the low power for the interaction (0.30) and main effect of the
respondent’s World Bank status (less than 0.20) given the risk of a Type II error, replication is
warranted before making conclusions regarding the current population.
190
For the winsorized GDP-adjusted data, there was no statistically significant interaction
with World Bank status of the respondent, World Bank status of the presiding arbitrator and
amounts awarded (F (3,41) = 0.516; p = 0.67; r = 0.19; n = 49). There was no statistically
significant relationship with the World Bank status of the respondent and amounts awarded (F
(3,41) = 1.233; p = 0.31; r = 0.29; n = 49). There was also no statistically significant
relationship between having a presiding arbitrator from a High or Middle Income state and
amounts awarded (F (1,41) = 0.402; p = 0.53; r = 0.10; n = 49). As all the effects ranged from
small to medium, the low power ranged from less than 0.20 to 0.60. Given the 40-80% risk of
a Type II error, replication is warranted before making conclusions regarding the current
population.
191
For the inverse transformations on GDP-adjusted data, there was no statistically
significant interaction with World Bank of the respondent, World Bank status of the presiding
arbitrator and amounts awarded (F (3,41) = 0.751; p = 0.53; r = 0.23; n = 49). There was no
statistically significant relationship with the World Bank status of the respondent and amounts
awarded (F (3,41) = 0.990; p = 0.41; r = 0.26; n = 49). There was also no statistically
significant relationship between a presiding arbitrator’s World Bank status and amounts
awarded (F (1,41) = 0.060; p = 0.81; r = 0.04; n = 49). For the main effect of a presiding
arbitrator’s World Bank status, with a less than small effect and non-significant result, the
failure to identify a relationship may not necessarily reflect a power problem. See supra note
159. As the two other effects, however, have low power (0.30-0.40), the 60-70% risk of a
Type II error warrants replication before making conclusions beyond the current dataset.

